OIDC authentication and session management for SvelteKit.
The library keeps three concerns separate:
It implements the protocol itself and does not depend on openid-client.
npm install @sourceregistry/sveltekit-oidc
// src/lib/server/auth.ts
import {createOIDC} from '@sourceregistry/sveltekit-oidc/server';
type Identity = {
sub: string;
email?: string;
name?: string;
roles: string[];
permissions?: string[];
};
type RequestData = {
permissions: string[];
};
export const oidc = createOIDC<Identity, RequestData>({
issuer: 'https://identity.example.com',
clientId: process.env.OIDC_CLIENT_ID!,
clientSecret: process.env.OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET!,
clientAuthMethod: 'client_secret_basic',
cookieSecret: process.env.OIDC_COOKIE_SECRET!,
scope: ['openid', 'profile', 'email', 'offline_access'],
resolveIdentity: ({idTokenClaims, userInfo}) => ({
sub: idTokenClaims.sub,
email: userInfo?.email ?? idTokenClaims.email,
name: userInfo?.name ?? idTokenClaims.name,
roles: Array.isArray(userInfo?.roles ?? idTokenClaims.roles)
? ((userInfo?.roles ?? idTokenClaims.roles) as string[])
: []
}),
beforeSessionPersist: async ({session, reason}) => {
const identity = await synchronizeUser(session.identity, reason);
return {...session, identity};
},
loadRequestData: async ({session, event}) => ({
permissions: await loadPermissions(session.sub!, event)
}),
createPublicSession: ({base, data}) => ({
...base,
identity: {
...base.identity,
permissions: data?.permissions ?? []
}
})
});
cookieSecret must contain at least 32 bytes of entropy. For example:
openssl rand -base64 32
Discovery and protocol endpoints must use HTTPS by default. Set allowInsecureHttp: true only for
local development providers. openid is always included in the requested scope, and values in
extraParams cannot replace security-sensitive authorization parameters such as state, nonce,
PKCE, redirect_uri, or client_id.
If the client registration fixes an ID-token signing algorithm, pin it explicitly:
idTokenSigningAlgorithms: ['RS256'],
trustedIdTokenAudiences: ['https://api.example.com']
The client ID is always required in aud. trustedIdTokenAudiences permits only explicitly trusted
additional audience values; it does not replace the client ID.
The extension points have deliberately literal names:
| Extension point | When it runs | Persisted |
|---|---|---|
resolveIdentity |
After provider data is validated, on login and refresh | Its result is persisted |
beforeSessionPersist |
Immediately before a login or refreshed session is written | Returned session replaces it; void keeps it |
loadRequestData |
Once while handle builds an authenticated request context |
Never |
createPublicSession |
When getPublicSession or toPublicSession projects a session |
Never |
Both login and refresh are explicit in the callback context. Returning a session from
beforeSessionPersist is what makes it the right place to provision or enrich application data —
e.g. upserting a user row — before the very first session for that user is persisted:
beforeSessionPersist: async ({session, reason}) => {
if (reason !== 'login') return;
const user = await upsertUser(session.identity);
return {...session, identity: {...session.identity, ...user}};
};
resolveIdentity runs first and may only be able to read application data (the user may not
exist yet on a first login). beforeSessionPersist runs next, right before the write, so a session
mutated or replaced there is the one every subsequent read of that session — including the result
returned from handleCallback/callbackHandler's onsuccess — actually sees.
// src/hooks.server.ts
import {oidc} from '$lib/server/auth';
export const handle = oidc.handle;
For every request, handle exposes:
event.locals.oidc.session; // persisted OIDC session
event.locals.oidc.identity; // resolved identity
event.locals.oidc.data; // request-only application data
Type the locals directly from the configured instance:
// src/app.d.ts
import type {OIDCLocals} from '@sourceregistry/sveltekit-oidc/server';
import type {oidc} from '$lib/server/auth';
declare global {
namespace App {
interface Locals {
oidc?: OIDCLocals<typeof oidc>;
}
}
}
export {};
// src/routes/auth/login/+server.ts
import {oidc} from '$lib/server/auth';
export const GET = oidc.loginHandler();
// src/routes/auth/callback/+server.ts
import {oidc} from '$lib/server/auth';
export const GET = oidc.callbackHandler();
// src/routes/auth/logout/+server.ts
import {oidc} from '$lib/server/auth';
export const POST = oidc.logoutHandler();
// src/routes/auth/backchannel-logout/+server.ts
import {oidc} from '$lib/server/auth';
export const POST = oidc.backChannelLogoutHandler();
The underlying operations are also available directly when a route needs custom behavior:
login(event, options)handleCallback(event)logout(event, options)handleBackChannelLogout(event)sequenceDiagram
participant Browser
participant login as loginHandler
participant callback as callbackHandler
participant logout as logoutHandler
participant bcl as backChannelLogoutHandler
participant OP as OpenID Provider
Browser->>login: GET /auth/login
login->>login: create PKCE pair, state, nonce
login-->>Browser: 302 redirect to OP authorize endpoint
Browser->>OP: authenticate
OP-->>Browser: 302 redirect with code & state
Browser->>callback: GET /auth/callback?code&state
callback->>OP: POST token endpoint (exchange code)
OP-->>callback: id_token, access_token, refresh_token
callback->>OP: verify id_token against JWKS
callback->>OP: GET userinfo endpoint (optional)
callback->>callback: resolveIdentity(idTokenClaims, userInfo)
callback->>callback: beforeSessionPersist(session, reason:'login')
Note over callback: a returned session here replaces
what gets persisted and returned
callback->>callback: write session (cookie or sessionStore)
callback-->>Browser: onsuccess(event, result) or 302 redirect
Browser->>logout: POST /auth/logout
logout->>logout: clear persisted session
logout-->>Browser: 302 redirect to OP end_session endpoint or local page
OP->>bcl: POST /auth/backchannel-logout (logout_token)
bcl->>OP: verify logout_token against JWKS
bcl->>bcl: backChannelLogoutStore.revoke(sid/sub)
bcl-->>OP: 200 OK
Note over bcl: next getSession()/requireAuth() call
for that sid/sub treats the session as revoked
handle (the SvelteKit hook) wraps every request outside of these four routes: it calls
getSession, which transparently refreshes an expiring session — running resolveIdentity and
beforeSessionPersist again with reason: 'refresh' — before exposing event.locals.oidc.
getSession(event)requireAuth(event)clearSession(cookies)Load a token-free session for the browser:
// src/routes/+layout.server.ts
import {oidc} from '$lib/server/auth';
export async function load(event) {
return {
session: oidc.toPublicSession(event.locals.oidc, event.depends),
sessionManagement: await oidc.getSessionManagementConfig()
};
}
toPublicSession projects the request context already loaded by handle. It does not read the
store, refresh tokens, or load application data again. createPublicSession receives both the
persisted session and loadRequestData result, but only exposes what the application explicitly
returns. getPublicSession(event) is available when the hook has not already loaded the context.
{@render children()}
{#if oidc.isAuthenticated}
Signed in as {oidc.identity?.email ?? oidc.identity?.name}
{/if}
OIDCContext supports local expiry handling, targeted SvelteKit revalidation,
check_session_iframe monitoring, and local or provider logout.
Idle deadlines use absolute timestamps, synchronize activity across tabs, and remain correct after a
tab or device resumes from sleep. The default idle action performs provider logout; set
redirectOnIdle="logout" only when clearing the application session without ending the OP
session is intentional. heartbeatUrl is application-owned and should be a same-origin,
CSRF-protected endpoint that returns 401 or 403 when the session is no longer valid.
When the OP iframe reports changed, the component first performs the Session Management 1.0
prompt=none authorization check in a hidden iframe. The login handler supplies the current ID token
as id_token_hint; a matching End-User refreshes the local session, while an OP error or a different
End-User clears it. Applications using the standard loginHandler() and callbackHandler() routes do
not need an additional endpoint.
Without sessionStore, the encrypted session is stored in the cookie. The default maximum serialized
cookie size is 3800 bytes so oversized sessions fail explicitly instead of being silently truncated by
a browser or proxy. Use a server-side store for large tokens or identities:
import type {OIDCSessionStore} from '@sourceregistry/sveltekit-oidc/server';
const sessionStore: OIDCSessionStore<Identity> = {
get: (id) => redis.get(`session:${id}`),
set: async (id, session) => {
await redis.set(`session:${id}`, session);
},
delete: async (id) => {
await redis.delete(`session:${id}`);
}
};
Use a shared backChannelLogoutStore when back-channel logout must work across multiple instances.
The built-in 'memory' stores are intended for local development or single-process deployments.
Providers that rotate refresh tokens also need a distributed refreshLock in multi-instance
deployments. The built-in promise coalescing prevents duplicate refreshes within one process; the
lock must serialize the supplied operation by session ID across every application instance:
const refreshLock = {
runExclusive: <T>(sessionId: string, operation: () => Promise<T>) =>
redlock.using([`oidc-refresh:${sessionId}`], 10_000, operation)
};
exp, and iat. Refreshed ID
tokens may omit nonce as allowed by OIDC Core, but must preserve subject, audiences, authorized
party, and authentication time.sub must match the validated ID token subject.iat, exp, jti, and exactly one or both of
sid and sub; nonce is rejected. Revocations expire and do not revoke later logins permanently.none, client_secret_basic, client_secret_post, client_secret_jwt, and private_key_jwt.Application code can normalize provider-specific data in resolveIdentity, but cannot replace the
validated ID token claims used by the protocol implementation.