sveltekit-oidc

OIDC authentication and session management for SvelteKit.

The library keeps three concerns separate:

• provider protocol data: validated ID token claims and optional UserInfo
• persisted authentication: tokens and the resolved application identity
• request data: application-owned authorization loaded once per request

It implements the protocol itself and does not depend on openid-client.

Install

npm install @sourceregistry/sveltekit-oidc
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Requires SvelteKit 3 and Svelte 5. If your app uses #lib as in the examples below, declare it in the app's package.json:

{"imports":{"#lib":"./src/lib/index.js","#lib/*":"./src/lib/*"}}
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The API reference lists every option and exported type.

Configure

Declare the server-only configuration variables required by SvelteKit 3:

// src/env.ts
import {defineEnvVars} from '@sveltejs/kit/env';

export const variables = defineEnvVars({
    OIDC_ISSUER: {},
    OIDC_CLIENT_ID: {},
    OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET: {},
    OIDC_COOKIE_SECRET: {}
});
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Set their values in your deployment environment. For local development, use an untracked .env file:

OIDC_ISSUER=https://identity.example.com
OIDC_CLIENT_ID=your-client-id
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=your-client-secret
OIDC_COOKIE_SECRET=replace-with-a-generated-secret
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// src/lib/server/auth.ts
import {createOIDC} from '@sourceregistry/sveltekit-oidc/server';
import {OIDC_ISSUER, OIDC_CLIENT_ID, OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, OIDC_COOKIE_SECRET} from '$app/env/private';

type Identity = {
    sub: string;
    email?: string;
    name?: string;
    roles: string[];
};

export const oidc = createOIDC<Identity>({
    issuer: OIDC_ISSUER,
    clientId: OIDC_CLIENT_ID,
    clientSecret: OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET,
    clientAuthMethod: 'client_secret_basic',
    cookieSecret: OIDC_COOKIE_SECRET,
    scope: ['openid', 'profile', 'email', 'offline_access'],

    resolveIdentity: ({idTokenClaims, userInfo}) => ({
        sub: idTokenClaims.sub,
        email: userInfo?.email ?? idTokenClaims.email,
        name: userInfo?.name ?? idTokenClaims.name,
        roles: Array.isArray(userInfo?.roles ?? idTokenClaims.roles)
            ? ((userInfo?.roles ?? idTokenClaims.roles) as string[])
            : []
    })
});
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Replace the placeholder cookie secret before starting the app. cookieSecret must contain at least 32 bytes of entropy. Generate one with:

openssl rand -base64 32
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Discovery and protocol endpoints must use HTTPS by default. Set allowInsecureHttp: true only for local development providers. openid is always included in the requested scope, and values in extraParams cannot replace security-sensitive authorization parameters such as state, nonce, PKCE, redirect_uri, or client_id.

If the client registration fixes an ID-token signing algorithm, pin it explicitly:

idTokenSigningAlgorithms: ['RS256'],
trustedIdTokenAudiences: ['https://api.example.com']
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The client ID is always required in aud. trustedIdTokenAudiences permits only explicitly trusted additional audience values; it does not replace the client ID.

Register an Authorization Code client with the provider. Allow the exact callback URL https://your-app.example/auth/callback; it must match the app origin and redirectPath. If you use provider logout, allow https://your-app.example/ as a post-logout redirect, or configure and register the path passed as postLogoutRedirectUri. Request a provider-supported refresh-token scope such as offline_access if you need refresh tokens. Provider policies determine whether a refresh token is issued and whether it rotates.

The extension points have deliberately literal names:

Extension point	When it runs	Persisted
resolveIdentity	After provider data is validated, on login and refresh	Its result is persisted
beforeSessionPersist	Immediately before a login or refreshed session is written	Returned session replaces it; void keeps it
loadRequestData	Once while handle builds an authenticated request context	Never
createPublicSession	When getPublicSession or toPublicSession projects a session	Never

Both login and refresh are explicit in the callback context. Returning a session from beforeSessionPersist is what makes it the right place to provision or enrich application data — e.g. upserting a user row — before the very first session for that user is persisted:

beforeSessionPersist: async ({session, reason}) => {
    if (reason !== 'login') return;
    const user = await upsertUser(session.identity);
    return {...session, identity: {...session.identity, ...user}};
};
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resolveIdentity runs first and may only be able to read application data (the user may not exist yet on a first login). beforeSessionPersist runs next, right before the write, so a session mutated or replaced there is the one every subsequent read of that session — including the result returned from handleCallback/callbackHandler's onsuccess — actually sees.

Use loadRequestData for request-specific authorization data, then createPublicSession if the browser needs a safe subset of it. Neither callback is required for basic authentication. Never include access, refresh, or ID tokens in the public session.

SvelteKit hook

// src/hooks.server.ts
import {oidc} from '#lib/server/auth.js';

export const handle = oidc.handle;
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For every request, handle exposes:

event.locals.oidc.session; // persisted OIDC session
event.locals.oidc.identity; // resolved identity
event.locals.oidc.data; // request-only application data
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Type the locals directly from the configured instance:

// src/app.d.ts
import type {OIDCLocals} from '@sourceregistry/sveltekit-oidc/server';
import type {oidc} from '#lib/server/auth.js';

declare global {
    namespace App {
        interface Locals {
            oidc?: OIDCLocals<typeof oidc>;
        }
    }
}

export {};
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Routes

// src/routes/auth/login/+server.ts
import {oidc} from '#lib/server/auth.js';
export const GET = oidc.loginHandler();
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// src/routes/auth/callback/+server.ts
import {oidc} from '#lib/server/auth.js';
export const GET = oidc.callbackHandler();
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// src/routes/auth/logout/+server.ts
import {oidc} from '#lib/server/auth.js';
export const POST = oidc.logoutHandler();
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// src/routes/auth/backchannel-logout/+server.ts
import {oidc} from '#lib/server/auth.js';
export const POST = oidc.backChannelLogoutHandler();
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The back-channel route is optional. To use it, configure backChannelLogoutStore, register its absolute URL with the provider, and ensure the provider advertises back-channel logout support. Use a shared store when the app runs on multiple instances.

The underlying operations are also available directly when a route needs custom behavior:

• login(event, options)
• handleCallback(event)
• logout(event, options)
• handleBackChannelLogout(event)

Request flow

sequenceDiagram
    participant Browser
    participant login as loginHandler
    participant callback as callbackHandler
    participant logout as logoutHandler
    participant bcl as backChannelLogoutHandler
    participant OP as OpenID Provider

    Browser->>login: GET /auth/login
    login->>login: create PKCE pair, state, nonce
    login-->>Browser: 302 redirect to OP authorize endpoint
    Browser->>OP: authenticate
    OP-->>Browser: 302 redirect with code & state

    Browser->>callback: GET /auth/callback?code&state
    callback->>OP: POST token endpoint (exchange code)
    OP-->>callback: id_token, access_token, optional refresh_token
    callback->>OP: GET JWKS when needed
    callback->>callback: verify id_token with JWKS
    callback->>OP: GET userinfo endpoint (optional)
    callback->>callback: resolveIdentity(idTokenClaims, userInfo)
    callback->>callback: beforeSessionPersist(session, reason:'login')
    Note over callback: a returned session here replaces<br/>what gets persisted and returned
    callback->>callback: write session (cookie or sessionStore)
    callback-->>Browser: onsuccess(event, result) or 302 redirect

    Browser->>logout: POST /auth/logout
    logout->>logout: clear persisted session
    logout-->>Browser: 302 redirect to OP end_session endpoint or local page

    OP->>bcl: POST /auth/backchannel-logout (logout_token)
    bcl->>OP: verify logout_token against JWKS
    bcl->>bcl: backChannelLogoutStore.revoke(sid/sub)
    bcl-->>OP: 200 OK
    Note over bcl: next getSession()/requireAuth() call<br/>for that sid/sub treats the session as revoked
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handle (the SvelteKit hook) runs for every request, including these routes. It calls getSession, which transparently refreshes an expiring session — running resolveIdentity and beforeSessionPersist again with reason: 'refresh' — before exposing event.locals.oidc.

• getSession(event)
• requireAuth(event)
• clearSession(cookies)

Public session

Load a token-free session for the browser:

// src/routes/+layout.server.ts
import {oidc} from '#lib/server/auth.js';

export async function load(event) {
    return {
        session: oidc.toPublicSession(event.locals.oidc, event.depends),
        sessionManagement: await oidc.getSessionManagementConfig()
    };
}
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toPublicSession projects the request context already loaded by handle. It does not read the store, refresh tokens, or load application data again. createPublicSession receives both the persisted session and loadRequestData result, but only exposes what the application explicitly returns. getPublicSession(event) is available when the hook has not already loaded the context.

Client context

<script lang="ts">
	import { OIDCContext } from '@sourceregistry/sveltekit-oidc';
	let { data, children } = $props();
</script>

<OIDCContext
	session={data.session}
	config={data.sessionManagement}
	idleTimeoutMs={30 * 60 * 1000}
	idleWarningMs={60 * 1000}
>
	{@render children()}
</OIDCContext>
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<script lang="ts">
	import { useOIDC } from '@sourceregistry/sveltekit-oidc';
	const oidc = useOIDC();
</script>

{#if oidc.isAuthenticated}
	<p>Signed in as {oidc.identity?.email ?? oidc.identity?.name}</p>
{/if}
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OIDCContext supports local expiry handling, targeted SvelteKit revalidation, check_session_iframe monitoring, and local or provider logout.

Idle deadlines use absolute timestamps, synchronize activity across tabs, and remain correct after a tab or device resumes from sleep. The default idle action performs provider logout; set redirectOnIdle="logout" only when clearing the application session without ending the OP session is intentional. heartbeatUrl is application-owned and should be a same-origin, CSRF-protected endpoint that returns 401 or 403 when the session is no longer valid. Supply the prop only after creating that endpoint; the example above does not require one.

When the OP iframe reports changed, the component first performs the Session Management 1.0 prompt=none authorization check in a hidden iframe. The login handler supplies the current ID token as id_token_hint; a matching End-User refreshes the local session. A definitive login failure or different End-User clears the matching local session. Temporary provider failures preserve it for retry, and a callback from an older login cannot replace a newer local session. Applications using the standard loginHandler() and callbackHandler() routes do not need an additional endpoint.

Session stores

Without sessionStore, the encrypted session is stored in the cookie. The default maximum serialized cookie size is 3800 bytes so oversized sessions fail explicitly instead of being silently truncated by a browser or proxy. Use a server-side store for large tokens or identities:

import type {OIDCSessionStore} from '@sourceregistry/sveltekit-oidc/server';

const sessionStore: OIDCSessionStore<Identity> = {
    get: (id) => redis.get(`session:${id}`),
    set: async (id, session) => {
        await redis.set(`session:${id}`, session);
    },
    delete: async (id) => {
        await redis.delete(`session:${id}`);
    }
};
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Use a shared backChannelLogoutStore when back-channel logout must work across multiple instances. The built-in 'memory' stores are intended for local development or single-process deployments.

For rotating refresh tokens in a multi-instance deployment, use both a shared sessionStore and a distributed refreshLock. The lock serializes refresh and logout by session ID across instances; after acquiring it, each instance rereads the shared store to find the current refresh token. The built-in promise coalescing prevents duplicate refreshes within one process. Cookie-only sessions cannot reliably coordinate a rotated refresh token across requests or instances because there is no shared current token to reread:

const refreshLock = {
    runExclusive: <T>(sessionId: string, operation: () => Promise<T>) =>
        redlock.using([`oidc-refresh:${sessionId}`], 10_000, operation)
};
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The lock's lease must remain valid for the complete token request and store write. Configure the lock implementation and its timeout for your provider's response times.

Security behavior

• Authorization Code flow uses PKCE, nonce, and an encrypted state value; each pending authorization transaction has its own cookie, so concurrent logins in separate tabs do not overwrite each other.
• Discovery metadata is bound to the configured issuer, and HTTPS is required unless explicitly disabled for local development.
• Initial ID tokens require matching issuer, client audience, nonce, exp, and iat. Refreshed ID tokens may omit nonce as allowed by OIDC Core, but must preserve subject, audiences, authorized party, and authentication time.
• UserInfo sub must match the validated ID token subject.
• Cookie sessions use authenticated encryption.
• Persisted sessions are checked against the configured client ID and issuer before use.
• A fresh login retires the previous server-stored session ID before issuing a new one.
• Silent re-authentication keeps a newer local login intact and retains a current session during temporary provider failures.
• Return and post-logout redirect values are restricted to same-origin paths.
• Local sessions have an eight-hour maximum lifetime by default.
• Refresh is automatic while a valid refresh token is available and is coalesced per session within a process. A temporary token-endpoint failure keeps a still-valid access token so the next request can retry. If the access token has expired, it returns a temporary 503 error but retains refresh credentials for a later retry. A rejected refresh token clears the session. If UserInfo is unavailable after a successful refresh, the rotated tokens are saved without carrying forward old UserInfo claims. The provider must return expires_in for expiry-driven automatic refresh; when it is omitted, the new access token's lifetime is unknown and the previous token's expiry is not reused. A rotated refresh token also does not inherit the previous refresh token's expiry.
• Back-channel logout tokens require the logout event, iat, exp, jti, and exactly one or both of sid and sub; nonce is rejected. A token with sid revokes only that session, while a token with sub alone revokes that user's sessions. Revocations expire and do not revoke later logins permanently.
• Local session clearing does not depend on provider discovery being available.
• Client authentication supports none, client_secret_basic, client_secret_post, client_secret_jwt, and private_key_jwt.

Application code can normalize provider-specific data in resolveIdentity, but cannot replace the validated ID token claims used by the protocol implementation.